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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
Pensacola Division  
 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, by and through   ) 
BILL McCOLLUM, et al.    ) 
       ) 
Plaintiffs,       ) 
       ) 
v.        )    Case No.: 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT  
       ) 
       ) 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF   ) 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al., ) 
       ) 
Defendants.       ) 
__________________________________________) 
 
 
BRIEF OF HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER JOHN BOEHNER AS AMICUS 
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
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INTEREST OF AMICUS 
Amicus House Republican Leader John Boehner, as a member of the leadership of 
the United States House of Representatives, amicus has a keen interest in the 
constitutional issues at stake in this case, as well as the long-term effects that the Court’s 
decision on summary judgment may have on the legislative process, notwithstanding any 
opposition amicus may have voiced to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(hereinafter “PPACA” or “Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010), on policy grounds.   
All members of Congress, including amicus, have taken oaths to uphold the 
Constitution of the United States.  While our constitutional system is built on both 
vertical and horizontal checks and balances, members of Congress have an independent 
responsibility to uphold the Constitution and to ensure that the Legislative Branch stays 
within the bounds of the powers afforded it by the Constitution.  In particular, amicus 
believes his perspective as a member of congressional leadership will be helpful to the 
Court in determining whether or not the Individual Mandate falls within Congress’s 
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Additionally, amicus is particularly well-
placed to discuss the negative effects that Defendants’ position would have on the 
legislative process.   
Defendants have argued that the PPACA’s reforms of the insurance market – 
which fall within Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce – “could not function 
effectively” without the Individual Mandate.  See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment, at 19 [hereinafter “Defs. MSJ”].  Indeed, Defendants 
state that, without the Individual Mandate, these reforms would “inexorably drive [the 
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health insurance] market into extinction.”  Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss, at 46 [hereinafter “Defs. MTD”] (quoting Health Reform in the 21st 
Century: Insurance Market Reforms: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Ways and 
Means, 111th Cong. (2009), at 13 (Uwe Reinhardt, Ph.D., Princeton University)) 
(alteration in original).  Consequently, Defendants argue that the Mandate is “essential,” 
and that Congress may employ “any means” reasonably adapted to “achieving [the] key 
reforms” found elsewhere in the Act.  Defs. MSJ at 23-24.     
 Defendants’ position is quite remarkable.  She largely admits that, without the 
Individual Mandate, the Act is dysfunctional and will have serious negative 
consequences.  These include, inter alia, (1) creating disincentives for private persons to 
obtain insurance, Defs. MSJ at 21 (“these new insurance regulations … would increase 
the incentives for individuals to make an economic and financial decision to forego 
health insurance coverage’ …”) (quoting PPACA §§ 1501(a)(2)(A), 10106(a)); (2) 
increasing premium costs, Defs. MSJ at 21 (stating that without the Individual Mandate, 
the PPACA “would drive up premiums, or reduce coverage, or both, for those who 
remained in the insured pool.”);1 and (3) ultimately bankrupting the insurance industry, 
Defs. MTD at 46 (the PPACA would “inexorably drive the health insurance market into 
extinction”) (alternations and quotations omitted).     
The Individual Mandate does not implement or facilitate enforcement of the Act’s 
insurance industry reforms.  Nonetheless, Defendants argue that the Mandate is necessary 
                                               
1
 In fact, premium costs are already significantly increasing as a result of the Act.  See, e.g., Janet Adamy, 
Health Insurers Plan Hikes, Wall St. Journal (Sept. 7, 2010), available at  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703720004575478200948908976.html (last visited Sept. 
8, 2010) 
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to avoid the Act’s negative effects, including those mentioned above.  In short, 
Defendants acknowledge that there is a gap between the goals of the statute and its real-
world results, and argue that the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to bridge 
that gap with an otherwise unconstitutional Individual Mandate.   
The Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the means to implement one or 
more of its enumerated powers.  See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 
(2010) (“we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related 
to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power”).   It does not, however, 
give Congress an all-purpose power to fill the gaps left by other legislation.  Indeed, a 
federal court has already found that the Individual Mandate extends beyond the 
commerce power’s “current high watermark.”  Virginia v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-cv-188, 
Mem. Op. at 18 (Aug. 2, 2010).     
If adopted by the court, this interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
would create incentives for Congress to pass ill-conceived or unrealistic statutes.  As 
House Republican Leader, amicus is uniquely positioned to make this argument and to 
explain why the Court should reject Defendants’ position.   
ARGUMENT 
I.   The Necessary and Proper Clause Does Not Support the Individual 
Mandate 
The Constitution gives Congress the power to “make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” its enumerated powers.  U.S. CONST. 
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art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  Thus, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the means to 
implement a proper exercise of a constitutionally enumerated power.  Comstock, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1956.  It does not, however, give Congress an untethered ability to exceed its 
constitutional limitations.   
 As Chief Justice Marshall explained in McCulloch v. Maryland:  “Let the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are 
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist 
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”  17 U.S. (Wheat.) 316, 
421 (1819); see also Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421).  
These limits on Congressional power “are not merely hortatory.”  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (Scalia, J. concurring).  The Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be 
stretched to include illegitimate ends, inappropriate means, or laws that are inconsistent 
with or beyond the scope of the Constitution.     
The Individual Mandate itself is not a permissible exercise of an enumerated 
power.  Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce does not allow it to compel 
passive individuals to engage in economic activity.  Indeed, in more than 220 years since 
Congress first convened, it has never even attempted to claim such power until now.  See 
Cong. Budget Office, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Health 
Insurance, at 1 (Aug. 1994) (Congress has “never required people to buy any good or 
service as a condition of lawful residence in the United States”); see also Virginia v. 
Sebelius, Mem. Op. at 18 (the Individual Mandate goes “beyond” the Commerce 
Clause’s “current high watermark”); id. at 31 (“No reported case from any federal 
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appellate court has extended the Commerce Clause ... to include the regulation of a 
person’s decision not to purchase a product ....”) (emphasis added); Thomas More Law 
Center v. Obama, No. 10-CV-11156, Mem. Op. at 15 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2010) (“The 
[Supreme] Court has never needed to address the activity/inactivity distinction advanced 
by plaintiffs because in every Commerce Clause case presented thus far, there has been 
some sort of activity”).   
Nor does the Mandate carry out a legitimate end in support of the other reforms 
found in the Act.  To the contrary, Defendants’ reliance on the Necessary and Proper 
Clause here is best seen for what it is:  an attempt to circumvent the limitations imposed 
on Congress by the Constitution.     
A.   The Mandate Is Not “Necessary” and It Does Not Implement a 
Legitimate Exercise of an Enumerated Power. 
The Supreme Court has made clear that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not 
grant Congress the legislative authority to enact a statute unless “the statute constitutes a 
means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated 
power.”  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.  Congress may rely on the Necessary and Proper 
Clause only where the statute is “legitimately predicated on an enumerated power,” the 
relationship between the two is not “too attenuated,” and the provision is not “too 
sweeping in its scope.”  Id. at 1963.        
   The Individual Mandate is not a “means” to carry out some other provision of the 
PPACA – it is a means and an end unto itself.  The goal is universal coverage, and the 
Individual Mandate seeks to achieve this goal by requiring virtually all Americans to 
obtain and maintain a Congressionally-approved level of health insurance.  The 
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Necessary and Proper Clause is not, however, an independent source of authority for 
achieving Congress’s policy goals.  It simply provides the means to implement or enforce 
a legitimate use of an enumerated power. 
Defendants have argued that the Individual Mandate is necessary – indeed, 
“essential” – to the PPACA’s reforms of the insurance market.  As Defendants have 
noted in this case, “the Act will bar insurers from refusing to cover individuals with pre-
existing medical conditions, and from setting eligibility rules based on health status, 
medical condition, claims experience, or medical history.”  Defs. MTD at 45.  The 
PPACA’s insurance-market reforms include, among others, the elimination of lifetime 
benefit limits and pre-existing condition exclusions (PPACA §§ 1001, 1201); mandatory 
coverage of certain preventive services (PPACA § 1001); extension of parental health 
coverage to unmarried adult children under 26 (PPACA § 1001); and various cost control 
measures (PPACA § 1001).  
Those sections of the Act do fall within Congress’s power, pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause, to regulate the interstate health insurance market.  See United States v. 
S.E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).  However, the Individual Mandate 
does not implement or enforce those sections.  Defendants  nowhere suggests that, 
without the Mandate, those sections would somehow become legally ineffective.   
Instead, Defendants have made a series of stunning admissions about the 
PPACA’s “reforms.”  According to Defendants, without the Mandate the Act will have 
serious negative consequences – including higher premium costs – that will harm 
consumers and will ultimately drive the health insurance market “into extinction.”  See 
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Defs. MTD at 45-46.  Defendants themselves have pointed to the dysfunctional nature of 
the PPACA: 
 
 “Congress found that, absent the minimum coverage provision, these new 
regulations would encourage more individuals to forego insurance, aggravating 
cost shifting and increasing premiums.”  Defs. MTD at 45 (emphasis added).   
 Without the Individual Mandate, “healthy individuals would have had 
overwhelmingly strong incentives ... to forego insurance coverage....”  Defs. MSJ 
at 24.  
 Without the Individual Mandate, the incentives created by the PPACA “would 
increase the costs of uncompensated care and the premiums for the insurance 
pool,” Defs. MTD at 45-46, and could also “decrease coverage … for those who 
remained in the insured pool,” Defs. MSJ at 21.   
 These pressures would “inexorably drive the health insurance market into 
extinction.”  Defs. MTD at 46 (emphasis added, internal quotations and alterations 
omitted).    
 
According to Defendants, the “[PPACA’s] reforms of the insurance market ... 
could not function” without the Individual Mandate.  Defs. MTD at 44-45; see also 
Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, at 14 [hereinafter “Defs. Reply Br.”] 
(“defendants’ position” is that the Individual Mandate “is essential to the private market 
insurance reforms in the [PPACA]”) (emphasis in original).  In short, Defendants have 
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argued that the Individual Mandate is “necessary” to avoid the negative consequences of 
the PPACA itself.   
Defendants’ argument relies on a misunderstanding of both the Necessary and 
Proper Clause and the limits of Congressional power.  The consequences that Defendants 
point to are quite serious – in fact, Defendants highlight some of the reasons why amicus 
voted against the Act.  These consequences do not, however, bring the Individual 
Mandate within the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause.   
As noted above, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the means to 
implement a proper exercise of its powers.  Thus, for example, in United States v. Darby 
the Supreme Court upheld recordkeeping requirements that facilitated enforcement of 
federal fair labor standards.  See 321 U.S. 100 (1941).  The Court reasoned that the 
recordkeeping requirements were “incidental to those for the prescribed wages and 
hours.”  Id. at 125.  “[S]ince Congress may require production for interstate Commerce to 
conform to those conditions, it may require the employer, as a means of enforcing the 
valid law, to keep a record showing whether he has in fact complied with it.”  Id.  In a 
similar vein, the Court has upheld federal requirements that prevent evasion or 
obstruction of valid federal regulations.  See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. 1; Wickard v. Filburn, 
317 U.S. 111 (1942).     
The Individual Mandate is fundamentally unlike these other provisions upheld by 
the Supreme Court under a Necessary and Proper analysis.  The Mandate does not 
implement the PPACA’s reforms of the health insurance industry.  Nor does it facilitate 
their enforcement.  Those sections of the PPACA stand on their own as an exercise of 
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Congress’s commerce power, and they do not need the Mandate to be legally effective.  
In contrast to the statute in Gonzales v. Raich, the Mandate does not prevent the evasion 
or obstruction of the PPACA’s other reforms.  The sections regarding “eligibility rules,” 
for example, are legally enforceable without the Individual Mandate. 
In short, the Individual Mandate is not necessary for implementation or 
enforcement of the PPACA’s insurance industry reforms.  Instead, Defendants claim that 
the Mandate is “essential” to avoid the consequences of those reforms:  bad incentives, 
higher premiums, and ultimately the “extinction” of the insurance industry.  See Defs. 
MTD at 45-46.  This view fundamentally misstates the purpose and scope of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  The Clause does not serve as a catch-all grant of 
Congressional power, that can be invoked by Congress whenever its goals (however 
laudable) do not match up with real-world results.   
Under Defendants’ logic, Congress could sidestep constitutional limitations on its 
powers any time it passes a statute with dysfunctional results.  In fact, the more 
dysfunctional a statute is, the more “essential” or “necessary” the statutory “fix” would 
be.  Thus, where there is a gap between Congress’ purported goal and a statute’s actual 
consequences, it would be “necessary,” and therefore constitutionally permissible, to 
bridge the gap with an otherwise unconstitutional provision like the Individual Mandate.  
The larger the “gap,” the greater the need to bridge the gap, and the greater Congress’s 
power to enact an otherwise impermissible remedy.  The more harm a statute does, the 
more power Congress could assume for itself under the Necessary and Proper Clause.   
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Defendants’ reasoning is neither constitutional nor logically sound.  Congress 
cannot circumvent the limits on its power by adopting statutes that are insufficient or 
unrealistic, and then relying on those failures as the basis for enacting statutory gap-fillers 
that exceed its powers under Article I.  Such action is not “legitimately predicated on an 
enumerated power.”2  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1963.    As a federal court has already noted 
in similar litigation, “[n]ever before” has the “Necessary and Proper Clause been 
extended this far.”  Virginia v. Sebelius, Mem. Op. at 25.      
B. Adopting Defendants’ Flawed Reasoning Would Have 
Harmful Long-Term Effects on the Legislative Process.   
Defendants’ interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause would cause 
significant long-term harm to the Constitution and would encourage future Congresses to 
pass ill-conceived or poorly-drafted laws.  Under their interpretation, a law would need 
only to be predicated upon a Congressional finding that it is “necessary” to alleviate the 
supposed negative effects of other legislation, effectively do away with the requirement 
that Congressional action be “legitimately predicated on an enumerated power.”  
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1963.  That would be a significant departure from settled law, 
eliminating one of the key limits on federal power.   
                                               
 
2
 Nor does the Individual Mandate survive the Supreme Court’s dictate that the provision not be 
“too sweeping in its scope.”  See Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1963.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a 
requirement more sweeping than the Individual Mandate.  A court has already found that the 
Mandate exceeds the commerce power’s “high watermark,” Virginia v. Sebelius, Mem. Op. at 18, 
and in more than 220 years Congress has “never required people to buy any good or service as a 
condition of lawful residence in the United States.” Cong. Budget Office, The Budgetary 
Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Health Insurance, at 1 (Aug. 1994).  The current 
Congress’s assertion of power is not merely “sweeping” – it is, as the Court has already found, 
“without prior precedent.”  10/14/10 Mem. Op., at 61.      
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As a practical matter, Defendants’ logic also invites poorly-conceived or poorly-
drafted statutes.  Congress could routinely enact statutes which, like the health insurance 
industry reforms discussed above, are defective or otherwise insufficient to actually meet 
Congress’s goals.  By doing so, Congress could render the use of extra-constitutional 
fixes “essential.”  Thus, Congress could use the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
circumvent the limits on its powers.  The more frequently Congress passes defective or 
contradictory statutes, and the more harmful or insufficient those statutes are, the greater 
the power that Congress could assume for itself under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
This natural extension of Defendants’ logic could also lead to less electoral 
accountability to voters.  The more convoluted the legislation passed by Congress, the 
more likely it will be that Members of Congress will not be able to understand or 
articulate the full scope of the legislation that has been considered and enacted.  
Consequently, Members will be less able to explain the impact of the legislation to their 
constituents, reducing the ability of voters to hold Members accountable for voting for 
clearly defined policies and making not only the legislative, but also the electoral process 
effectively dysfunctional.  Such concerns have been contemplated in our democracy for 
more than 230 years.
3
  This Court has observed the importance of legislative transparency 
in the passage of new taxes in order for the public to hold its elected representatives 
                                               
3
 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison): “It will be of little avail to the people, that the 
laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, 
or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are 
promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is today, 
can guess what it will be tomorrow.  Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a 
rule, which is little known, and less fixed?”  Justice Breyer makes the parallel argument that the 
transparency of judicial opinions fostering governmental accountability.  See Stephen G. Breyer, 
Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View 83 (Knopf 2010).   
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accountable.  See 10/14/10 Mem. Op., at 26-29.  Transparency is no less important outside 
the tax context. 
If adopted by the Court, this interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
would create incentives for Congress to pass ill-conceived or unrealistic statutes.  Indeed, 
one need look no further than Defendants’ own briefs to see the negative consequences of 
such an approach.  The PPACA is a morass of requirements, many with unrealistic or 
conflicting goals.  The result is a statutory scheme which, without the Mandate, will 
likely decrease the number of persons with health insurance, will increase costs for those 
who obtain insurance, and will drive the health insurance market “into extinction.”  See 
Defs. MTD at 45-46.  Defendants’ reasoning is flawed and the court should reject any 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause that would encourage future 
Congresses to pass laws in such a deleterious manner.   
CONCLUSION 
 For all the foregoing reasons, amicus curiae House Republican Leader John 
Boehner respectfully requests that the Court grant Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment.   
 
Dated November 16, 2010 
 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
      /s/ Carrie L. Severino             
      CARRIE L. SEVERINO 
      FLND Bar Admission Date: 11/08/2010 
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